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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
.JOHN F. LEDKINS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8537 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts presented in appellant's 
brief is substantially true and respondent adopts it for 
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STATE1fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THEAPPELLANTISPROPERLYCHARGED 
WITH A STATUTORY OFFENSE. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 64-9-38 
A~D 64-9-41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
TO THE APPELLANT IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
.:\XD HE H~\S XO STAXDIXG TO COMPLAIN 
OF POSSIBLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AP-
PLICATIONS OF OTHER PARTS OF THOSE 
STATUTES. 
POINT III 
THE LEGISLATURE H ... >\.S :.\IADE THE OF-
FE~SE CHARGED_.:\. FELONY. 
~·\RGU::\IENT 
POINT I 
Tli~~ ~\ PPI·:LL~\XT I~ PROPERLY CHARGED 
\VITH .\ f'rr~\TPrrOR.Y OFFEXSE. 
Onr code of rriminal procedure contains a provision 
to the dfPd that an accused may be bound over on an 
offense different from that originally set forth in the 
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"If it appears from the examination that a 
public offense has been committed and that there 
is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty 
thereof, the magistrate must indorse on the com-
plaint an order, signed by him, to the following 
effect: 'It appearing to me that the offense in the 
within complaint mentioned (or any offense, ae-
cording to the fact, stating generally the nature 
thereof) has been committed, and that there is suf-
ficient cause to believe the within named A B 
guilty thereof, I order that he be held to ans·wer 
til the same.' '' 
In this case the appellant was charged originally 
with wilfully and knowingly violating the rules and 
regulations of the Utah State Prison while employed 
there as a guard. At the preliminary hearing, prior to 
the taking of any testimony, the complaint was amended 
by the addition of a count charging him with attempting 
to wilfully and knowingly supply drugs to an inmate 
while employed as a guard at the prison. On the re-
verse side of the complaint, the committing magistrde 
indorsed that the appellant was held to ans\ver to ''the 
offense in the within complaint.'' The court's entry on 
"\Iareh 15, 1956, shows that the first count was dismissed 
and that it was necessarily the second count which 
charged the offense on which the appellant was bound 
over. The evidence in the preliminary hearing, then, 
sho\vs ''sufficient cause'' to believe that an offense -
the attempt to wilfully and knowingly supply drng~ 
to an inmate while employed as a guard at the lTtah 
State Prison- had been committed and that the appel-
lant was the person who committed it. 
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An information was then filed erroneously charging 
the appellant in the language of the dismissed count. At 
the hearing on appellant's Motions to Quash and to Dis-
miss, it was agreed that an amended information would 
be filed correcting the error, and the motion was argued 
as if that had previously been done (R. 26-27). Section 
77-17-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, permits amendment 
of an information at any time before the plea is entered, 
and the appellant has no basis for objection herein on 
that point. 
He does object, however, to the language of the 
amended information. vVhere the count on which he 
was bound over says, '' * * * did wilfully and knowingly 
attempt to supply drugs * * *" the amended infor-
Ination says "* * * the crime of attempting to gh,·e or 
sell drugs * * * ''. (Italics supplied) This court is asked to 
hold that this is fatal to the prosecution herein. 
While the cases hold that an information gen-
(•rally is sufficient if it charges an offense in the lan-
guage of the statute, e.g., State Y. Stull r, 96 P. 2d 479 
(\Vasl1. 1939), they do not hold that the exact statutory 
language is a necessity. On the contrary, language sub-
stantially similar to the wording is sufficient. Sparkman 
, .. State 93 P. 2d 1095, (Okla. 1939): Prople Y. Jan·is, 
'27 P. 2d 77 (Cal. App. 1933). In Jlidki.tf Y. State, 30 P. 
2d 1057, at page 1058 the .:\rizona Supreme Court said: 
'·A comparison of the language of the information 
with the wording of the statute shows that they 
nre substantially the same. This is all that is re-
( 1uired, especially where the offense is statutory, 
as here. (cases cited)" 
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And the language of Cornmonwealth v. GrecnP, 98 ~A. 2d 
202 (Pa. 1953) is appropriate to the facts of this case. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said: 
"It is not essential that the information be 
couched in the precise language of the statute, if 
the words used have substantially the same mean~ 
ing. Commonwealth v. Friedla-nder, 53 Pa. Super. 
221. Failure to properly support, as charged, is 
the precise equivalent of neglecting to maintain 
within the contemplation of § 733 of the Act. Gf. 
Commonwealth , .. George, 358 Pa. 118, 123, 56 A. 
2d 228, ·where similar terms are used interchange-
ably. Contrary to appellant's contention, no one 
could have been misled to conclude that the infor-
mation intended to charge the defendant with the 
indictable misdemeanor defined in§ 731 of the Act, 
18 P. S. § 4731." 
Although in this case it is the statement of the offense 
on which the appellant was bound over, rather than the 
information, which does not follow the exact language 
of the statute, the rationale of the above cited cases 
would seem to apply by necessary implica t] on. \Vha t is 
important is that the appellant not be misled as to the 
charge he must defend against, and there can be no 
question that the language of the second count in the 
complaint apprised this appellant and his counsel, that 
the offense he was bound over on is the same crime 
charged in thP language of the amended information. 
This conclusion is supported by the definitions of 
gice and supply found in Webster's new International 
Dictionary, second edition: 
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''GrvE 
•X< * *3. rro deliver or transfer (to another some-
thing that is taken by him). * * * Syn.-Sup-
ply, * * *" 
''SUPPLY 
* * * 6. To furnish or provide. Specif.: (a) to give 
(something desired ,needed, etc.) ; * * * '' 
Com1nonwealth v. Davis, 75 Ky. 24, 241 (1876), held that 
the word give should not be limited to a strict meaning 
of transfer without consideration, where used in an 
indictment for violation of the liquor laws of Kentucky. 
The court said : 
"In its strict and primary sense the word 'give~ 
signifies 'to confer or transfer without any price 
or reward; to bestow.· In its more enlarged sense 
it signifies 'to furnish, to supply' : and it was in 
this latter sense the word was used in the statute." 
rrhe foregoing authorities show clearly that there 
1s no substance to the appellant's contention that he 
received no preliminary hearing on the offense charged 
in tht> information. 
POINT II 
rl'HE APPLICATIO~ OF SECTIOXS 64-9-38 
~\~D 64-9-41, UTAH CODE .A~XOT.A.TED 1953, 
rro THE APPELLANT IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
.\:\D HE HAS NO ~T .. 1~D1XG TO COMPLAIN 
OF POSSIBLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AP-
PLH~~\rriONS OF OTHER PARTS OF THOSE 
Sr:l'A rrUT ES. 
rJ'his appeal is taken at a point in the proceedings 
:tgaiust the appellant at whirh he stands charged by 
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an amended information of the statutory offense of at-
tempting, while employed as a guard at the Utah State 
Prison, to wilfully and knowingly, give or sell drugs to 
an inmate of the prison. The offense is made out by 
reading together Sections 64-9-41 and 64-9-38, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, and applying our statute on at-
tempts, Section 76-1-30. 
Section 69-941 says, among other things, that no 
drug shall be given to any convict in the prison except 
by the prison physician and then only if the convict 
is ill. Section 64-9-38, Utah Code Annotated 1953, so far 
as pertinent, reads as follows : 
'' * * * Any guard, keeper or other employee of the 
state prison who knowingly violates any rule or 
regulation adopted by the board, or who violates 
any of the provisions of this chapter, or who neg-
lects to perform the duties required of him by the 
rules and regulations of the prison or by the pro-
visions of this chapter, is guilty of a felony, and 
may be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or 
by imprisonment in the state prison for a period 
not exceeding three years, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment.'' 
That the appellant was at first charged under 
another part of Section 64-9-38 and that such other part 
of the section is of doubtful constitutionality, even if 
true, matters not at all at this point. The appellant has 
no standing to challenge in this court possible unconsti-
tutional applications of a statute resulting from an 
active imagination and having no basis in fact with re-
spect to him. It is a basic concept of constitutional law 
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that a party cannot raise conjectural issues having no 
relation to the facts in the matter at bar. 11 Am. Jur. 
Constl. Law, Sec. 111, states in part: 
"It has been said that courts cannot pass on 
the question of the constitutionality of a statute 
abstractly, but only as it applies and is sought to 
be enforced in the determination of a particular 
case before the court, for the power to revoke or 
repeal a statute is not judicial in its charac-
ter. "" "" "" 
''One cannot invoke, in order to defeat a law, 
an apprehension of what might be done under it 
and which, if done, might not receive judicial ap-
proval ; to complain of a ruling one must be the 
victim of it. * * * 
''These principles apply fully to criminal 
proceedings. * * • An accused cannot raise the 
question of the constitutionality of a statute 
which is not the basis of the prosecution against 
him. Thus, a defendant charged with the viola-
tion of a statute, but not charged with any act 
coming under a certain severable section of the 
statute, is without the interest necessary to ques-
tion the Yalidity of that section. • • •" 
To the same effect are rnited Public Workers v. 
il/it('hell, 330 F. S. /;) (1947); Kay Y. Fnited States, 303 
U.S. 1 (1938); Coffman Y. Breeze C'orporations,323 U.S. 
316 (1945) and Shinn Y. Oklahoma City, 87 P. 2d 136 
(Okla. 1939). 
Apellnut maintains that the statute in question is 
not seYerahle and that this case therefore comes within 
t ht' sometime-recognized exception to the above gen-
eral rule that where an act is indivisible, a party may 
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successfully attack its invalid portions even though they 
do not affect his rights. Even if this exception were 
held to be the law in Utah, we see no basis for its ap-
plication in this case. The part of the section to which 
appellant objects is that which makes a violation of the 
prison rules and regulations a felony. But it is not shown 
how this relates to the part making a violation of the 
provisions of Chapter 9 a crime, and there apparently is 
no relationship. The deletion of the alleged invalid pro-
visions by no stretch of the imagination disembowels 
this statute. Under the remaining language there are 
left sixty-three separate sections of Chapter 9, Title 64 
to be enforced, all of them definite, clear statements of 
the legislative will. 
The test, according to Sutherland Statutory Con-
stitution, 3rd edition, Section 2404 '' * * * is whether 
or not the legislature would have passed the statute had 
it been presented with the invalid features removed." 
Quoting further in the same section, "In statutes not 
containing a separability clause, the independence of the 
valid portion of a statute will be a principle indicia of 
the legislative intent that a statute be separately en-
forced.'' It is true that in borderline cases, criminal 
statutes are sometimes put to a more stringent severa-
bility test than are civil statutes, Sutherland, Section 
2418, 11 Am. Jur, Constitutional Law, Section 166, but 
this is not a borderline case. The wording of the sec-
tion applicable to the appellant in this case leaves no 
doubt that it stands independent of the alleged uncon-
stitutional portions. Where that is so, the remaining 
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provisions must be given effect. 11 Am. J ur. Constitu-
tional Law 152. Smith v. Carbon County, 81 P. 2d 370 
(Utah 1938). 
POINT III 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS l\'IADE THE OF-
FENSE CHARGED A FELONY. 
Chapter 9 of Title 64, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
deals with the Government of the Utah State Prison 
and Section 64 thereof makes a violation of any of its 
provisions by any person, firm, or corporation a misde-
meanor. Section 38 singles out guards or keepers, and 
says that if any such shall violate any provision of the 
chapter he is guilty of a felony. This arrangement of 
penal provisions is in accordance with the recommenda-
tion of Sutherland, supra, at Section 4826, where he 
states: 
''The better practice is to place a general penalty 
section at the end or near the end of the act and 
provide that any violation of the provisions of the 
act is punishable according to the terms of the 
penalty section. If it is desirable to punish some 
acts more severely than others, by the increased 
penalties for the violation of particular provis-
ions, the increased penalties should be added as 
separate sections immediately following the gen-
eral penalty section. In this way the legislative 
intent is clearly expressed. Occasionally, it is jus-
tifiable to include particular penalty provisions 
at the place in the statute where the prohibited 
act is specified, but as a general rule the inclusion 
of the penalties at the end of the statute permits 
10 
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a more orderly development of the legislative reg-
ulation and creates a clearer picture of the 
liabilities which the act specifies." 
No reason appears why effect may not be given to 
both provisions of this statute. Western Beverage Co. 
of Provo v. Hansen, 96 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1939), State v. 
Gates, 221 P. 2d 878 (Utah 1950). The two provisions 
are in no way conflicting, and each can be given its 
proper application by following the rule that where two 
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter, 
one being specific and the other general in its treatment, 
the specific provision controls the general. Salt Lake 
City v. Salt Lake County, 209 P. 207 (Utah 1922) and 
cases there cited; State ex rei Public Service Commis-
swn v. Southern Pacific Company, 79 P. 2d 25 (Utah 
1938). 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant is properly charged with a statutory 
offense which violates no provision of our Constitution 
and on which he has been given a proper preliminary 
hearing. This appeal should be dismissed and the mat-
ter returned to the District Court for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully, submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
K. ROGER BEAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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